Abstract. The region which discharges pollution from the production processes is not necessarily coincident with the region which suffers from this pollution. This kind of problem is often called a transboundary pollution problem (TBP problem). Many articles which deal with TBP problems have been written since 1990. In this paper, we will survey these preceding articles by contrasting the symmetric two-region model with the asymmetric one, where in our model, "asymmetric two-region" means that region 1 derives less satisfaction from consuming the good but cares more about the pollution stock and the welfare of the coming generation than does region 2. In the symmetric model, the steady state of the pollution stock is always less under cooperative pollution control than in the non-cooperative case in which a Markov-perfect strategy is supposed, but the converse is possible in the asymmetric model. In the analyses of TBP model, we usually employ Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (H-J-B equation). Therefore, based on the "principle of optimality" in dynamic programming, we have established the H-J-B equation as a general formula applicable to TBP problems.
Introduction
There are many articles which deal with economic-environmental systems in a dynamic context. Keeler et al. (1971) is one of the pioneer works. However, it is only recently that attention has been directed to such systems from an inter-regional view point. We can easily find relevant works in the 1990s; see, for example, Clemhout and Wan (1991) , Kaitala et al. (1991) , Dockner and van Long (1993) , Martin et al. (1993) , Tahvonen (1996) , and Zagonari (1998). We call this kind of problem a transboundary pollution problem (TBP problem for short). They formulate their models as differential games in which two players self-enforc ingly control their pollution emissions under a feedback information structure in order to maximize the discounted stream of welfare; and they analyze the models with the aid of the * I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professor Murray C. kemp for his valuable comments on earlier versions and for continuing encouragements. My thanks go to anonymous referees of this journal for their constructive cmments. Finaly, I acknowledge financial support from Nanzan University (Pache Research Subsidy I-A). Clemhout and Wan (1994, p. 804) ). We also focus on information structures, (a) and (e).
We now formulate an n-player dynamic game as follows: Utilizing the characteristic of an infinite horizon problem, problem [AP] reduces to
we immediately have
Thus W(t0, b) is independent of t0, allowing to denote W(t0 , b) by W(b). Accordingly,
In the same way, for any t and x(t)(•ßx) ,
(2-8) Using (2-8), the H-J-B equation (2-3) reduces to Thus we have obtained the following H-J-B equation which is applicable to models of TBP .
3.An application of the H-J-B equation to TBP problems
In this section, we study the question "How does the H-J-B equation apply to TBP problems ?". We especially focus on the difference between symmetric and asymmetric two region models. For this purpose, we follow Dockner and van Long (1993) in the symmetric case and Zagonari (1998) in the asymmetric case.
We consider a two-region model in which each region produces a single consumption good. Pollution is emitted by the production process and each of the two governments controls its pollution emission to maximize welfare. Depending on the relationship of the two regions, there are two cases of pollution control. First is the case in which both regions cooperatively control their pollution emissions. Second is the case where each region self enf orcingly (non-cooperatively) controls its own pollution emission. Moreover, we divide the latter case into two. In one sub-case each region adopts a linear Markov-perfect strategy;
and in the other sub-case neither region imposes linearity on its strategies. We shall refer to the second sub-case as involving non-linear Markov-perfect strategies.
We provide analyses for a symmetric two-region model and an asymmetric two-region model. The following three main results emerge.
(1) In the symmetric model, the steady-state of the pollution stock is always less under cooperative pollution control than in the non-cooperative case in which a linear Markov perfect strategy is supposed. On the other hand, the converse is possible in the asymmetric model.
(2) Whether the model is symmetric or asymmetric, the solution curve with a linear Markov-perfect strategy corresponds to a limiting case of the solution curve with a non linear Markov-perfect strategy.
(3) In the symmetric model, if the discount rate is sufficiently small, the steady-state of the pollution stock under non-cooperative pollution control in which a non-linear Markov perfect strategy is supposed is close enough to that under cooperative pollution control, but the former is higher than the latter. However, in the asymmetric model, it is possible that the former is lower than the latter.
In 3-1, we introduce notation and formulate the time path of the pollution stock and welfare functions. Then, in 3-2 and 3-3, respectively, we analyze the cooperative and non cooperative cases. Depending on the supposed strategies, 3-3 is divided into 3-3-1 and 3-3-2.
In the former, we deal with the case of a linear Markov-perfect strategy by using the guessing method3; and in the latter, we deal with the non-linear case by using an auxiliary equation.4
3-1 Notation
We use the following notation in this section (i=1, 2). For example, Qi(t) means the value Qi at time t. If necessary , we attach t to the relevant variable from now on.
The economy with which we are concerned is as follows . There are two regions. Ni identical consumers live in region i(i=1, 2). The consumers of region i produce a single consumption good. However, the production of one unit of the consumption good in region i generate the pollution Ei, and that region's emission-consumption trade-off is expressed as Qi=Fi(Ei). Given natural purification rate k, the time path of the pollution stock is supposed to be P(t)=E1(t)+E2(t)-kP(t).
(3-1-1)
For the purpose of easy calculation, we specify the functional form of utility functions and cost functions as and where Ai and si are given positive constants (i=1, 2). Under such a specification , we have to suppose that Ai-Ei>0 to ensure the positive marginal utility of Ei. Moreover, we define the net benefit to the representative consumer of region i at time t as ui(Fi(Ei)/Ni)-ci(P) , namely, Substituting (1) and (2) into (3-3-1), the constant terms and the coefficients of the terms P and P2 must to satisfy the system (constant terms)
(coefficients of the P-terms)
(coefficients of the P-terms).
In the symmetric model, the system reduces to From (2), the optimal time path of P is written as
Along the optimal path, the steady-state stock of pollution PL is given by Thus PLS and PLA are derived as (S1) and (AS1), respectively. In both the symmetric and asymmetric models, because it reveals the possibility that the steady-state value of the pollution stock is smaller when two regions behave self-enforcingly than when they behave cooperatively .
Non-linear Markov-perfect strategy (auxiliary equation approach)
We first deal with the symmetric model. In this model, we denote the optimal solution to the maximization problem on the right hand side of (3-3-1) by E(P), which is given by
Substituting (3-3-2) into (3-3-1), (3-3-3) Let us temporarily assume that ƒÂ=0. Then, (3-3-3) reduces to arid, from the above equation, the optimal solution is obtained as . Then, the auxiliary equation (3-3-6) reduces to (3-3-7)
Returning to (3-3-4), we can easily verify that, if ƒÂ=0, then are the solutions to (3-3-7).
Let us define 
From now on we confine ourselves to the case S1=1.7 From the definition of P and Y , (3-3-14) where 7 Zagonari (1998) implicitly assumes that B=1(s1=1 in our model); otherwise, the equation which the general solution of his (26) (Zagonari (1998, p. 60) has to satisfy would be (4) The steady-state line YNA=Y(PNA) passes through the point (A2/k4, -A1) . 
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have formulated TBP problems as 2-player dynamic games under a feedback information structure, derived a tool for analyzing such dynamic games, namely the H-J-B equation, from Bellman's principle of optimality, and applied this equation to symmet ric and asymmetric models. From the results of section 3, we arrive at the following two conclusions.
First, we compare our symmetric model with our asymmetric model. In the symmetric model, the level of the steady-state stock of pollution under non-cooperative pollution control in which a non-linear strategy is adopted is close enough to that under cooperative pollution control on condition that the discount rate is sufficiently low, but the former can never be less than the latter. On the other hand, in the asymmetric model, it is possible that the steady-state stock of pollution under non-cooperative pollution control is lower than that under cooperative pollution control. For example, in the case of assuming a non-linear Inoue strategy, a sufficient condition for the achievement of the above situation is a sufficiently high discount rate in the eco-development oriented region (region 1) .
Second, we examine whether the governments of the two regions should impose linearity on their strategy in the case of non-cooperative pollution control. The non-linear Markov perfect strategy is preferable in that we can find more solution curves under the non-linear strategy than under the linear one; and, what is more, one of the former outcomes is characterized by a lower steady-state stock of pollution than is the latter outcome .
As already noted, most earlier analyses of TBP problems have been confined to the linear-quadratic functional form and to a restricted set of parameter values . We propose to carry out simulations for a greatly enlarged set of parameter values and even for alternative functional forms. These simulations will be based on Kimura (1998)'s "intelligent simulation method". In this way, we hope to arrive at qualitative conclusions of much greater scope than have hitherto been available.
